Minnesota · Criminal process and other offenses

Prohibiting Giving Peace Officer False Name in Minnesota

Minnesota Statutes § 609.506 does more than prohibit giving an invented name during a traffic stop. Current law creates six theories involving fictitious names, false birth dates, false or altered identification cards, another real person’s identity, and false identity information given to court officials during a criminal proceeding.

Primary authorityMinn. Stat. §§ 609.506, 609.02, 626.84, and 628.26; State v. Thompson, 950 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 2020); State v. Costello, 620 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. App. 2001), reversed on other grounds, 646 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 2002)Research standardOfficial sources citedLast updatedNovember 4, 2026

Minnesota false-name defense guide

Giving a False Name to Police or Court Officials in Minnesota

Minnesota Statutes § 609.506 does more than prohibit giving an invented name during a traffic stop. Current law creates six theories involving fictitious names, false birth dates, false or altered identification cards, another real person’s identity, and false identity information given to court officials during a criminal proceeding. Every theory requires an intent to obstruct justice. The officer theories also require an inquiry made during a lawful investigatory stop, lawful arrest, or another duty imposed by law. The difference between a misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor often turns on whether the accused allegedly supplied invented or false information or instead used another actual person’s name and date of birth.

Direct representation

You will work directly with me.

If you hire me, I will compare the officer’s report and recording with the exact identifying information you gave, determine which subdivision was charged, and test the alleged intent to obstruct justice. I will also examine whether the inquiry occurred during a setting covered by the statute, whether the name was genuinely false or a nickname, whether another person’s complete identity was actually used, and whether evidence resulting from the encounter is subject to a separate constitutional challenge.

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Six statutory alternatives

The current statute separates false information from identity theft-like conduct

01

Fictitious name to a peace officer

With intent to obstruct justice, giving a defined peace officer a fictitious name other than a nickname during a covered inquiry. Under Thompson, “fictitious” can include a misleading partial or rearranged legal name.

Classification: misdemeanor.

02

False date of birth to a peace officer

With obstructive intent, giving a false date of birth to the officer during a covered inquiry. The state must prove falsity, the speaker’s identity, the particular date supplied, and intent—not merely that a database initially failed to match.

Classification: misdemeanor.

03

False or altered identification card

With obstructive intent, giving the officer a false or fraudulently altered identification card during a covered inquiry. The physical or digital item, alteration, presentation, knowledge, and chain of custody may matter.

Classification: misdemeanor.

04

Another person’s identity to police

With obstructive intent, giving a real other person’s name and date of birth to the officer during a covered inquiry. The statutory text uses both items, so the complaint and proof should not reduce this theory to any inaccurate name.

Classification: gross misdemeanor.

05

Fictitious identity information in court

In a criminal proceeding and with obstructive intent, giving a court official a fictitious name other than a nickname or a false date of birth. A court official includes a judge, referee, court administrator, or any court employee.

Classification: misdemeanor.

06

Another person’s identity in court

In a criminal proceeding and with obstructive intent, giving a court official another person’s name and date of birth. Identity of the other person and the criminal-proceeding setting are degree-selecting facts.

Classification: gross misdemeanor.

Charge comparison

Small factual differences can change the subdivision and maximum

The state may amend a charge when discovery clarifies whether the information was invented, partial, or belonged to another person. That makes the original recording, dispatch notes, citation, database query, identification card, and records proving legal identity important. A court should not be asked to infer the gross-misdemeanor theory merely because a false name happened to match someone who exists; the statutory phrase and the accused person’s knowledge and intent still require proof.

Intent to obstruct justice

Falsity and obstructive intent are separate elements

A person can give incorrect information without intending to obstruct justice. Name changes, adoption history, hyphenated names, transliteration, cultural naming conventions, language barriers, confusion, memory error, clerical mistakes, incorrect database entries, a mistyped birth year, and an officer’s misunderstanding can create mismatches. The state must prove not only that information was false but also that it was supplied with the required purpose.

Intent is commonly inferred from circumstances: repetition after clarification, denial of other names, possession of accurate identification, use of an identity connected to a person with a valid license or clean record, knowledge of a warrant, inconsistent spellings or dates, attempts to hide documents, messages discussing avoidance, or an admission. The defense should examine whether each fact was known at the time, whether the recording supports the report, and whether an innocent explanation remains reasonable.

State v. Thompson illustrates the distinction. The Supreme Court held that a partial legal name could be “fictitious,” but it emphasized the statute’s intent requirement and the nickname exception. Thompson told the officer that the partial name was his name and denied using other names; the records search failed, and his omitted surname led away from his full legal identity and an active warrant. The decision does not make every omission, shortened name, former name, or transcription problem criminal. It defines the name term while leaving intent as an independent element.

Correcting information can be important evidence, but it does not create an automatic safe harbor. In State v. Costello, the Court of Appeals treated the defendant’s testimony that he initially used his brother’s name hoping his brother had a valid license as sufficient intent evidence even though he supplied his own name after an officer’s warning. The Minnesota Supreme Court later reversed that case on an unrelated juror-question procedure, so the lower court’s identity discussion must be presented with that procedural history rather than as an untouched supreme-court holding. Timing, spontaneity, warning, reason for correction, and whether an officer relied on the false information remain fact questions.

The encounter and recipient

Officer theories require both a covered officer and a covered inquiry

The recipient must fit the incorporated peace-officer definition

Subdivisions 1 and 2 incorporate § 626.84, subdivision 1(c). A complaint should identify the recipient’s status and agency. Most traffic-stop and arrest cases will involve a licensed peace officer, but the label should not be assumed for every security employee, correctional employee, probation officer, federal agent, private investigator, or other government worker. The incorporated statutory definition and any cross-jurisdiction authority must be checked.

The inquiry must arise in one of three settings

The officer must make the inquiry incident to a lawful investigatory stop, incident to a lawful arrest, or incident to executing another duty imposed by law. The first two categories raise familiar Fourth Amendment and Minnesota constitutional questions: what facts supported the stop, when it began, whether its scope or duration was expanded, what supported the arrest, and when the identifying question occurred. The third category can include other legally imposed duties, but the prosecution should identify the duty rather than rely on an officer’s general desire for information.

The word “lawful” modifies the investigatory stop and arrest. A suppression motion may challenge evidence obtained through an unlawful seizure, but the remedy is not resolved merely by showing a problem in the encounter. Courts distinguish the elements of § 609.506, exclusion of particular evidence, attenuation, inevitable discovery, identity evidence, and new conduct occurring during police contact. Counsel must analyze the actual sequence and controlling search-and-seizure law rather than promise that an illegal stop automatically erases every later charge.

A request for identification is not a universal command to answer everything

Section 609.506 criminalizes particular affirmative false information given with obstructive intent. It does not say every person approached by police must answer every identity or investigative question. Whether a person may decline, whether driving laws require production of a license, whether booking procedures compel information, and whether the Fifth Amendment applies are context-specific questions. The safest general advice is not to invent information or use another person’s identity, to avoid physical resistance, and to request counsel when legally entitled to do so.

Court-official theories have different setting language

Subdivision 3 applies “in any criminal proceeding” and defines court official broadly to include a judge, referee, court administrator, or any employee of the court. The record should show what proceeding was occurring, who received the information, how it was documented, whether the accused person understood the question, and why the state claims obstruction. Information given to police in a courthouse does not automatically become a subdivision 3 court-official case; recipient and setting both matter.

Evidence map

The recording and database trail usually matter more than a summary label

Preserve the citation, complaint, officer cards, hearing paperwork, name-change and identity records, and any video or audio already received. Write down spellings and sequence while memory is fresh. Do not alter an ID card, delete messages, contact another person to coordinate an explanation, or use someone else’s account to access protected records.

Minnesota authority

A partial legal name can be fictitious—but intent remains essential

State v. Thompson: the controlling definition

The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the argument that a fictitious name must be invented from nothing. Reading the ordinary meaning together with the nickname exception, the court held that a false name can include a partial or rearranged legal name. A person therefore cannot necessarily avoid subdivision 1 by selecting genuine pieces of a legal name if the result falsely represents the person’s identity.

The holding should be applied precisely. Thompson did not argue that the name was a nickname, and the parties agreed the evidence supported the other elements. The court did not eliminate the intent requirement. It also did not decide that every failure to recite a full formal name is fictitious. The inquiry remains whether the information was a false name rather than an excepted nickname and whether it was given with intent to obstruct justice during a covered inquiry.

Costello: intent and later correction

The Court of Appeals found sufficient intent evidence where the accused testified that he initially used his brother’s name while hoping the brother had a license, then gave his true name after warning. That part of the opinion is useful as a fact illustration, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the judgment on a separate issue involving juror questions. A current brief should cite the full procedural history, rely primarily on Thompson for the controlling name definition, and analyze intent from the present record.

What the cases leave for litigation

Neither decision resolves every form of nickname, alias, chosen name, transliteration, former legal name, recording error, or database mismatch. Neither makes the legal basis of the officer’s inquiry irrelevant. And neither turns correction timing into a categorical rule. Those questions depend on the statutory text, the exact communication, the person’s knowledge and purpose, and any applicable constitutional doctrine.

Penalties and consequences

There is no felony theory or universal minimum custody term in § 609.506

The subdivision 1 officer theories and the fictitious-name/false-birth-date portion of subdivision 3 are misdemeanors. Minnesota’s general misdemeanor ceiling is 90 days of imprisonment and/or a $1,000 fine. Subdivision 2 and the other-person identity portion of subdivision 3 are gross misdemeanors, with a general maximum of 364 days and/or $3,000. Section 609.506 states no universal minimum custody term. Section 609.101 separately supplies a $300 minimum-fine starting figure for the misdemeanor theories and a $900 figure for the gross-misdemeanor theories, subject to a lower uniform Judicial Council fine schedule. Qualifying public-defender status, indigence, or undue hardship permits reduction to at least $50; community work service may substitute for a fine; and installments may be authorized.

A maximum is not a prediction. The court may consider the facts, record, plea or verdict, victim impact where legally relevant, obstruction purpose, prompt correction, harm to the other person whose identity was used, acceptance of responsibility, and lawful sentencing factors. Possible outcomes and conditions can include a stay, probation, local confinement, fines, fees, restitution if legally supported, community work, or conditions related to underlying conduct. A separate warrant, driving offense, controlled-substance charge, identity-theft theory, forgery allegation, obstruction count, or violation discovered during the encounter carries its own analysis.

Using another person’s identity can create practical consequences beyond the sentence: incorrect records for that person, warrant or citation confusion, license consequences, employment or licensing disclosure, immigration questions, and difficulties correcting agency databases. Those effects are not automatic elements or universal penalties, but they should be identified and addressed. Immigration advice requires analysis by qualified counsel because the precise conviction record, intent language, sentence, and federal classification matter.

Section 628.26 supplies the limitations framework rather than § 609.506 itself. The alleged statement date, complaint filing date, amendments, tolling facts, and offense classification should be checked against the law applicable to the offense date. Evidence preservation should begin immediately even when a limitations defense may exist.

Defense analysis

Questions that can materially change the case

Was the name false, another person’s, or an excepted nickname?

Identify the exact name given and the person’s legal name on that date. Compare adoption, marriage, divorce, tribal, immigration, and court name-change records. Determine whether the person regularly used the name as a nickname or alias and whether the officer clarified. If the state alleges another real person’s identity, confirm that person exists and that both the person’s name and birth date were supplied.

Can the state prove obstructive intent?

Ask why the information was given, what the person knew, whether the statement was repeated, whether accurate identification was available, and when correction occurred. A failed database query is not itself proof of intent. Conversely, an active warrant is relevant context but does not automatically establish why a particular answer was given.

Was the officer inquiry statutorily covered?

Separate the initial contact, seizure, questioning, records check, arrest, and search on a minute-by-minute timeline. Identify reasonable suspicion, probable cause, consent, and the other legal duty claimed. Then assess element and suppression issues under current Minnesota and federal law without assuming one remedy answers every question.

Does the evidence prove the charged recipient and setting?

For a police theory, verify the recipient meets the incorporated peace-officer definition. For a court location, identify the criminal proceeding and the judge, referee, administrator, or employee who received the information. A form completed for another agency may require a different statute.

Are separate charges or consequences being overstated?

False-name conduct sometimes appears beside driving-after-revocation, warrant, drug, obstruction, forgery, or identity-theft allegations. Each count must stand on its own elements and admissible evidence. The fact that a records check led to another allegation does not prove the mental state for § 609.506, and the § 609.506 conviction does not automatically prove the other offense.

How I would work up this charge

A lawyer’s file review of Prohibiting Giving Peace Officer False Name in Minnesota

A useful defense analysis starts by slowing the case down. The title of the charge is not an element, and the largest number in a penalty provision is not a prediction. I read the count, the incorporated definitions, and the alleged facts side by side before I tell a client what I think.

Read the count as a set of propositions the State must prove

A careful review of Prohibiting Giving Peace Officer False Name in Minnesota begins with Minn. Stat. §§ 609.506, 609.02, 626.84, and 628.26; State v. Thompson, 950 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 2020); State v. Costello, 620 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. App. 2001), reversed on other grounds, 646 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 2002) and the precise theory alleged in the complaint. The legal label may suggest a level of seriousness, but it cannot replace proof of the conduct, mental state, result, status, relationship, value, injury, prior event, or other circumstance the chosen provision requires.

I organize the evidence around those requirements instead of reading the police narrative as a finished story. Each proposition should lead to a source, and each source should be checked for context, reliability, and admissibility. This makes it easier to see what is genuinely disputed, what information is still missing, and which legal issue could produce a meaningful remedy.

The evidence I would ask for first

For Prohibiting Giving Peace Officer False Name in Minnesota, I would not begin with a canned list of defenses. I would begin with the source file: the charging paper, every police report, uncut recordings, witness interviews, warrants and returns, device and account records, photographs with metadata, expert or laboratory material, certified prior records, court orders, and any document the prosecution relies on to prove an element or increase the classification. A police summary can identify what an officer or witness says happened, but it cannot substitute for the recording, photograph, data, or document being summarized. The same is true of a complaint. It identifies the prosecution’s theory at the start of the case; it does not prove the theory.

I put those materials on one chronology. That lets me see what was known at each decision point, which account was contemporaneous, what appeared only after people spoke with one another, and where the record is silent. It also keeps an admissibility question separate from a factual one. A fact can be disputed even if the evidence was lawfully obtained. Evidence can also be accurate yet inadmissible for a particular purpose. Those are different arguments and should not be blurred together.

Read the charging document against the offense date

The alleged date matters because statutes, penalty thresholds, definitions, sentencing rules, and published decisions change. I save the version in force on that date and read the session-law history when the current online text is different. I also check whether a later amendment was merely clarifying or made a substantive change; that is a legal question, not an assumption. The same discipline applies to prior convictions and administrative events. A prior must fit the definition the charged statute actually uses, fall within any stated lookback period, and be proved by a reliable record.

I then compare the formal count with the probable-cause narrative and the discovery. If the prosecution’s theory shifts, I want the amended pleading and enough detail to prepare. If several factual alternatives are alleged, I identify whether they are separate elements, alternative means, enhancement facts, or merely evidentiary details. That distinction affects notice, motions, jury instructions, unanimity arguments, and how a verdict form should be read.

Separate an evidentiary weakness from a suppression issue

Not every troubling fact produces a motion to suppress. Suppression ordinarily requires a constitutional, statutory, or rule-based violation with a remedy that reaches the evidence at issue. A weak identification, an incomplete investigation, or a witness inconsistency may be powerful at trial without making evidence inadmissible. By contrast, a stop, search, interrogation, identification procedure, warrant, or test can raise a legal issue even when the resulting evidence appears incriminating. I analyze both tracks and do not promise dismissal simply because one problem exists.

For a search issue, I reconstruct what officers knew before each intrusion and what authority they claimed. For a statement, I examine custody, questioning, warnings, voluntariness, recording, and the complete context. For scientific or technical evidence, I request the method, underlying data, quality-control material, uncertainty information, and chain of custody. For hearsay or confrontation questions, I identify the actual statement, its purpose, the declarant, and the proposed foundation. Specificity matters; “the evidence is bad” is not a motion.

Prepare negotiation and trial at the same time

A plea decision should be compared with the case the State could present at trial, not with the complaint’s maximum penalty in isolation. I want to know the strongest admissible proof, the weakest required element, the realistic motion practice, the likely instructions, and the consequences of every proposed disposition. That includes custody, probation, treatment, restitution, driving, firearm restrictions, registration, employment or licensing, immigration consultation, family-court effects, and record consequences when they are actually triggered. I avoid telling a client that every collateral consequence applies to every conviction.

Trial preparation gives negotiation its credibility. Witness interviews, exhibit review, motions in limine, expert consultation, demonstrative evidence, jury instructions, and a clean theory of the case force both sides to confront what can be proved. Negotiation can continue while that work is underway. The two tracks are not opposites.

A case-law point worth keeping in its proper place

Appellate decisions matter, but a quotation should not be detached from the issue the court was deciding. In State v. Fleck, 777 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010), the Minnesota Supreme Court described sufficiency review as viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the conviction.” That is an appellate-review rule, not a reduction of the State’s trial burden. At trial, the prosecution still must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt. I cite the case for the proposition it actually decided and then return to the charged statute, the jury instructions, and the admissible evidence in the present file.

What I would want you to understand before choosing an outcome

You should be able to identify the exact charge, the facts that set its level, the disputed elements, the evidence that matters most, the motions that have a legal basis, the realistic trial issues, and the concrete effect of each proposed resolution. If an answer depends on a missing report, recording, expert opinion, or certified record, I will say so. An honest answer about what remains unknown is more useful than a confident guess.

Authorities used for this guide

  • Minn. Stat. § 609.506 — six officer and court-official theories, intent, settings, classifications, nickname exception, and court-official definition.
  • Minn. Stat. § 609.101, subdivisions 4 and 5 — minimum-fine framework, nonfelony schedule qualification, hardship reduction, community-work alternative, and installment authority.
  • Minn. Stat. § 609.02 — Minnesota’s general misdemeanor and gross-misdemeanor definitions and ceilings.
  • Minn. Stat. § 626.84 — incorporated peace-officer definition.
  • Minn. Stat. § 628.26 — criminal limitations framework.
  • State v. Thompson, 950 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 2020) — controlling partial-name and nickname analysis.
  • State v. Costello, 620 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. App. 2001), reversed on other grounds, 646 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 2002) — intent/correction fact illustration with procedural limitation.

This guide was researched against current official law on October 30, 2026. The alleged offense date, exact words and documents, charged subdivision, recipient, encounter’s legal basis, later authority, and admissible record control.

Legal information, not legal advice. This guide provides general information about Minnesota law. It does not create an attorney-client relationship. Case-specific advice begins only after I understand the complete facts and we agree that I represent you.